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In PS v Ontario, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that section 7 of the Charter requires 
that persons who are civilly committed for six months or more must have access to 
meaningful review over the conditions of their detention. In this paper, the authors argue 
that the decision has broad implications for provincial civil commitment regimes across the 
country. In particular, the Court’s analogy to the Criminal Code Review Board jurisprudence 
opens the door to a fuller recognition of the profound deprivation of liberty involved in civil 
commitments. An expanded role for civil review tribunals may be required, including Charter 
jurisdiction. The decision, and Ontario’s legislative response, also leave open the pressing 
question of the scope of liberty interests guaranteed by section 7 for those who are civilly 
committed for shorter periods of time. The authors conclude that this decision should trigger 
a reconsideration of civil commitment review processes across the country for all persons 
detained in psychiatric facilities.
Dans l’affaire PS c. Ontario, la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a conclu que l’article 7 de la Charte 
exige que les personnes internées pour six mois ou davantage dans un hôpital psychiatrique 
aient droit à une révision probante de leurs conditions d’incarcération. Dans cet article, les 
auteurs prétendent que ce jugement affecte largement partout au pays les programmes 
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provinciaux d’internement dans des hôpitaux psychiatriques. En particulier, l’analogie entre 
la Cour et la jurisprudence relative aux commissions d’examen en matière criminelle ouvre 
la porte à une meilleure reconnaissance de la profonde privation de liberté qu’entraîne 
l’internement dans un hôpital psychiatrique. Cela pourrait donner aux tribunaux responsables 
de la révision des cas d’internement dans des hôpitaux psychiatriques un rôle plus étendu, 
comprenant une compétence sur la Charte. Le jugement et la réponse législative de l’Ontario 
ouvrent également la porte à la question contraignante de la portée des libertés que garantit 
l’article 7 aux personnes internées pour de plus courtes périodes de temps. Les auteurs sont 
d’avis que ce jugement devrait entraîner dans l’ensemble du pays une reconsidération du 
processus de révision de l’internement dans des hôpitaux psychiatriques.
CIVIL COMMITMENT REGIMES in every province and territory in Canada allow 
the state to detain individuals with a mental illness without their consent, usually 
on the basis that they present a threat to themselves or to others, or are at risk 
of serious physical or mental deterioration.1 Such detentions must be renewed 
1. See Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 22(3)(c)(ii) [BC Mental Health Act]; Mental 
Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s 2 [Alberta Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Services Act, 
SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1, s 24(2)(a)(iii) [Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act]; Mental 
Health Act, CCSM, c M110, s 17(1)(b)(i) [Manitoba Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Act, 
RSO 1990, c M.7, s 20(1.1) [Ontario Mental Health Act]; Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment 
Act, SNS 2005, c 42, s 17 [Nova Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act]; Mental Health 
Act, RSNB 1973, c M-10, s 8.1(1) [New Brunswick Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Care 
and Treatment Act, SNL 2006, c M-9.1, s 17(1)(b)(ii)(A) [Newfoundland Mental Health 
Care and Treatment Act]; Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, s 13(1) [PEI Mental Health 
Act]; Mental Health Act, RSY 2002, c 150, s 13(1) [Yukon Mental Health Act]; Mental Health 
Act, RSNWT 1988, c M-10, s 13 [NWT Mental Health Act]; Mental Health Act (Nunavut), 
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periodically. While there are limits on each renewable period of detention, 
no jurisdiction has imposed a limit on the overall length of time an individual 
may be detained. Every province and the Yukon have a tribunal to which a civilly 
committed individual may apply to have his or her detention reviewed.2
Civil commitment has been described as “the most significant deprivation of 
liberty without judicial process that is sanctioned by our society.”3 Some advocates 
hoped that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 would serve as the 
catalyst for the reform of civil commitment laws and for a greater recognition of 
the liberty interests involved but, with a few exceptions, the Charter has not lived 
up to its billing.5 H Archibald Kaiser has called for a reassessment of coercive 
hospitalization and treatment as the centrepiece of mental health law given 
RSNWT 1988, c M-10, s 13 [Nunavut Mental Health Act]. In Québec a physician may 
place a person under preventive confinement for up to 72 hours without authorization of 
the court and prior to psychiatric examination if he or she is of the opinion that the person 
presents a grave and immediate danger to himself and others: An Act Respecting the Protection 
of Persons Whose Mental State Presents a Danger to Themselves or to Others, CQLR c P-38.001, 
s 7 [Protection Act]. With respect to deterioration, Ontario requires “serious physical 
impairment” to the individual (ibid, s 20 (5)(a)(iii)), whereas British Columbia requires 
“substantial physical or mental deterioration” (ibid, s 22(3)(c)(ii)).
2. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 25; Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 41; 
Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act, supra note 1, s 34(8); Manitoba Mental Health 
Act, supra note 1, s 56(1); Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 39(1); Nova Scotia 
Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, supra note 1, s 68; Newfoundland Mental Health Care 
and Treatment Act, supra note 1, s 64(1)(a); PEI Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 28(1); 
Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 30(1). North West Territories and Nunavut do not 
have a review tribunal and instead decisions on detention are made by a territorial judge. 
In Québec, appeals are heard before the Administrative Tribunal of Québec: Protection 
Act, supra note 1, s 21. In New Brunswick the tribunal reviews applications submitted by 
reviewing physicians for involuntary admission and then determines whether to confirm in 
writing an order for that person to be admitted involuntarily: New Brunswick Mental Health 
Act, supra note 1, s 8.1(1).
3. Raj Anand, “Involuntary Civil Commitment in Ontario: The Need to Curtail the Abuses of 
Psychiatry” (1979) 57 Can Bar Rev 250 at 251.
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
5. H Archibald Kaiser, “Canadian Mental Health Law: the Slow Process of Redirecting the 
Ship of State” (2009) 17 Health LJ 139 at 148-49. One notable exception is the decision 
in Fleming v Reid, [1991] 4 OR (3d) 74, 82 DLR (4th) 298, where the Ontario Court 
of Appeal found that the existing treatment regime for persons deemed incompetent to 
consent to treatment violated section 7 of the Charter because it failed to consider previously 
expressed wishes made by the individual when competent.
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Canada’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.6 
To date, neither courts nor legislatures have picked up on this call to action.
Three aspects of the civil commitment process have attracted Charter 
scrutiny. First, the Charter has been used to challenge the criteria by which 
the commitment decision is made, usually by physicians. With one notable 
exception, judges have shown deference to legislators and to physicians in 
assessing the criteria for civil commitment.7 Second, the Charter can be used to 
challenge the statutory regime for nonconsensual treatment that may accompany 
6. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 189 UNTS 137 
[CRPD]. While the CRPD does not explicitly address involuntary hospitalization and 
treatment, Kaiser argues that some provisions bring the coercive nature of provincial Mental 
Health Acts into question. For example, he refers to article 17: “Every person with disabilities 
has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with 
others.” Kaiser concludes that “[t]he CRPD demands no less than a tabula rasa study of the 
entire current system of Canadian involuntary measures, which are so firmly anchored in 
the now displaced or at least repositioned medical model.” H Archibald Kaiser, “Law and 
Psychiatry in the Age of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)” 
in Richard D Schneider & Hy Bloom, eds, Law and mental disorder: a comprehensive and 
practical approach (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) 1333 at 1345 [Kaiser, “Law and Psychiatry”]. 
See also H Archibald Kaiser, “The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Beginning to Examine the Implications for Canadian Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities” 
(2012) 20:2 Health L Rev 26. The PS Court does not refer to the CRPD, which in general 
has not garnered the attention of courts in Canada.
7. McCorkell v Riverview Hospital (Director), [1993] BCJ No 1518, 104 DLR (4th) 391 
[McCorkell]. In McCorkell, Justice Donald rejected a Charter challenge to the BC civil 
commitment criteria. For a more detailed discussion, see the text accompanying note 69. See 
also Thompson and Empowerment Council v Ontario, 2013 ONSC 5392, [2013] OJ No 4106; 
Reference re Procedures and Mental Health Act (1984), 5 DLR (4th) 577, 8 CRR 142, (sub 
nom Re Jenkins) 45 Nfld & PEIR 131, 132 APR 131 (PEICA) where the PEI Court of Appeal 
upheld the impugned legislation, finding that the provision on involuntary commitment did 
not constitute prohibited discrimination on the basis of mental disability under s 15(1) and 
that restrictions owing to the infirmity of people with mental disabilities were reasonable limits 
within s 1. Further, since involuntary persons detained under the Act may have the validity of 
their detention determined by habeus corpus, there was no violation of s 10.
 Thwaites v Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric Facility, [1988] 3 WWR 217 [Thwaites], 
was an early exception to this where the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that committal 
criteria failed to sufficiently define the persons who could be subject to committal and the 
circumstances under which they could be compulsorily detained. The standard at issue in 
Thwaites was extremely all-encompassing as the legislation provided that a person could 
be admitted involuntary if a qualified medical practitioner thought the person “should be 
admitted as a patient at a psychiatric facility.” After the Thwaites decision, the government 
responded by amending the legislation to provide for a “dangerousness” test to be met prior 
to certifying involuntary admission. The legislation also provided a more specific definition 
of “mental disorder” and “mental retardation.”  
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civil commitment, depending on the particular legislative regime in force in the 
province.8 Finally, the procedures and powers of the review tribunals that exist in 
almost every jurisdiction to review civil commitment may be subject to a Charter 
challenge. It is this last stage that is the focus of this article.
This article addresses a groundbreaking decision of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal that required the Ontario government to revise significantly the 
legislation governing its civil commitment review tribunal and has the potential 
to prompt changes to the role of such tribunals across Canada. In PS v Ontario,9 a 
panel of five judges of the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that the civil 
commitment legislation in Ontario violated section 7 of the Charter because it 
provided for long-term commitment without adequate procedures to protect the 
liberty interest of the person committed. The Court held that an individual could 
not be civilly committed beyond six months, because the Consent and Capacity 
Review Board (“CCB”), the tribunal that reviews commitment decisions in 
Ontario, did not have jurisdiction to monitor and ensure that the committed 
individual was receiving appropriate treatment and being held in conditions 
that were minimally restrictive of his or her liberty. In this article, we argue that 
the Court’s decision is broad enough to apply to all Canadian jurisdictions that 
have civil mental health tribunals and has the potential to change radically the 
landscape of civil commitment review tribunals in Canada. We also examine 
the Ontario government’s response to the PS decision and argue that, while the 
response will improve the plight of persons detained for more than six months, 
its narrow scope is likely to lead to further litigation around the protections given 
to those detained for shorter periods of time.10
This amended legislation was upheld in Bobbie v Health Sciences Centre, [1988] MJ No 485, 
[1989] 56 Man R (2d) 208 (MBQB).
8. In a landmark Ontario Court of Appeal decision, the Court struck down the provisions of 
Ontario’s Mental Health Act that allowed the best interests of an incompetent individual to 
override his or her previously expressed competent wishes about treatment. See Fleming v 
Reid, supra note 5. Recently, a Charter challenge was launched to the provisions of the BC 
Mental Health Act which provide that any treatment given to someone detained involuntarily 
is “deemed” to be given with the consent of that person. The Council of Canadians with 
Disabilities and two individual plaintiffs are challenging this law under s.7 of the Charter. See 
Andrew Woo, “B.C. patients launch court challenge over psychiatric treatments” The Globe 
and Mail (13 September 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/
bc-patients-launch-court-challenge-over-forced-psychiatric-treatments/article31846031/>; 
BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 31(1).  
9. 2014 ONCA 900, [2014] 379 DLR (4th) 191 [PS].
10. When we refer to commitment of greater than six months in PS, we are actually referring 
to commitments that are longer than six months and two weeks, which is the actual time 
allowed for by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s remedy. See infra note 53.
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I. PS V ONTARIO AND ITS NATIONAL SCOPE
A. THE FACTS
After serving a sentence of forty-five months in Kingston Penitentiary for sexual 
assault against a twelve year-old boy, during which time he received no treatment or 
therapy,11 PS was civilly committed under Ontario’s Mental Health Act. He remained 
committed at the Oak Ridge division of Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre 
(now called the Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care) for nineteen years in 
circumstances that even his doctors conceded constituted mere warehousing.12 The 
appellant was deaf and had very limited ability to speak or understand spoken 
language. He communicated using a version of Signed English and some American 
Sign Language (ASL).13 PS spent his entire time in a maximum security wing at 
Waypoint Centre even after a hearing by the CCB concluded that, while he met 
the conditions of civil commitment, he did not require placement in maximum 
security. The CCB also found repeatedly that Waypoint did not have treatment 
programs suitable for someone with his limited communication skills. Year after 
year, medium security facilities declined to accept the appellant as an inpatient.14 
PS was fifty-six years old at the time of the hearing.
B. THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRIC “GATING”
Why had PS been detained for such a long period of time? He was subject to 
a practice that is commonly referred to as psychiatric “gating.”15 Gating is a 
colloquial term used to describe the practice of civilly committing a person, who 
is identified as dangerous, at or near the end of a sentence of imprisonment.16 
11. PS, supra note 9 at para 7.
12. Ibid at para 61. Generally, warehousing refers to the detention of a person indefinitely in 
a therapeutic hospital setting without providing him or her with medical treatment i.e., 
a non-therapeutic detention.
13. Ibid at para 6.
14. Ibid at para 9.
15. See Yukimi Henry, “Psychiatric Gating: Questioning the Civil Committal of Convicted Sex 
Offenders” (2001) 59:2 UT Fac L Rev 229; Andres Hannah-Suarez, “Psychiatric Gating of 
Sexual Offenders under Ontario’s Mental Health Act: Illegality, Charter Conflicts and Abuse 
of Process” (2005-2006) 37:1 Ottawa L Rev 71.
16. In several US states, “gating” has been accomplished by the passage of statutes authorizing 
the civil commitment of sexual offenders to psychiatric treatment facilities. In June 2015, 
a Federal District Court Judge in Minnesota ruled the civil commitment of sexual offenders 
at the end of their criminal sentences to be unconstitutional. Karsjens et al v Jenson et al, Civ 
No 11-3659 (D Minn 2015).
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In effect, gating represents the use of civil commitment to continue to detain 
someone who can no longer be held by the criminal justice system but is thought 
to present a danger to the public. It is used almost exclusively for sex offenders, 
whose sexual deviance can be labelled as a form of mental illness in order to satisfy 
the legal requirements of civil commitment. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld 
this practice in 1995 in Starnaman v Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre,17 as 
long as the individual meets the requirements for commitment prescribed by the 
Mental Health Act. The Court of Appeal in Starnaman rejected arguments that 
gating is an inappropriate use of the civil commitment system to augment the 
dangerous offender regime set out in the Criminal Code,18 and held that it was 
not contrary to section 7 of the Charter. Gating is controversial in part because 
serious doubts are available with respect to whether effective treatment regimes 
exist for personality disorders and disorders such as pedophilia. In other words, 
persons committed to hospital for personality and sexual disorders have little 
realistic opportunity of having a diagnosed condition remediated to the point of 
no longer meeting the civil commitment requirements.19 Thus, individuals who 
are gated are likely to become long-term detainees of psychiatric facilities. While 
the decision in PS is not limited to those who have been gated and applies to 
anyone detained involuntarily for more than six months, gated individuals are 
likely to become long-term detainees.
We have not been able to find any gating cases outside Ontario. While this 
may be explained by different protocols and policies adopted by health systems 
and practitioners in the other provinces, it would also seem to result from the 
variation in commitment criteria. Criteria in several jurisdictions incorporate the 
requirement that the mental disorder require treatment in a psychiatric facility.20 
17. Starnaman v Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, [1995] 24 OR (3d) 701,100 CCC (3d) 
190 [Starnaman]. The Ontario Divisional Court reached a similar result in Penetanguishene 
Mental Health Centre v Stock, [1994] OJ No 1545 [1994] 116 DLR (4th) 550.
18. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
19. Kaiser describes the intractable problem created by those who present a danger based on a 
personality disorder yet who are found to be criminally responsible: “The very nature of a 
personality disorder compared to psychosis virtually guarantees that there will be conflict and 
uncertainty at every level of the accused’s experience with the criminal justice and mental 
health care systems.” H Archibald Kaiser, “R v Knoblauch: A Mishap at the often ambiguous 
crossroads between the criminal justice and the mental healthcare systems” (2001) 37 CR 
(5th) 401 at 404.
20. See e.g. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 22(3)(c)(i); Saskatchewan Mental Health 
Services Act, supra note 1, s 24(2)(a)(i); and Manitoba Mental Health Act, supra note 1, 
s 17(1)(b)(ii).
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Ontario has no such requirement.21 PS was heard by a panel of five justices 
because the Court of Appeal thought that the constitutionality of psychiatric 
gating, upheld in Starnaman, might need to be reconsidered. In the end, 
however, the Court focused on all long-term detainees and did not address the 
constitutionality of gating.
C. JURISDICTION OF THE CONSENT AND CAPACITY BOARD
The PS case deals with the decision-making authority of Ontario’s CCB, 
an administrative tribunal whose extensive jurisdiction in health care matters 
is unique among Canadian provinces. The CCB serves as a review tribunal for 
those who have been civilly committed to psychiatric facilities in Ontario, but 
it has several other functions as well. The CCB has decision-making authority 
with respect to review of medical determinations of incapacity to consent to 
treatment,22 the appointment of a representative to consent to treatment,23 
review of appointments of substitute decision-makers for incapable individuals, 
applications by substitute decision-makers to depart from the prior wishes of 
a person made during a period of capability,24 and review of consent given to 
the admission of incapable individuals to hospital facilities.25 These functions 
are all in addition to its review of civil commitment to psychiatric facilities and 
commitment to community treatment orders (CTOs) under the Ontario Mental 
Health Act. The CCB has no counterpart in the rest of Canada26 where, generally 
speaking, civil mental health review tribunals have jurisdiction only to review 
civil commitment and, in some provinces, to review CTOs and applications by 
hospitals to override treatment refusals.27 Given its various roles, the CCB is a 
21. Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 20(5).
22. Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 2, Sched A, s 32.
23. Ibid, s 33.
24. Ibid, s 36.
25. Ibid, s 34.
26. With the exception of the Yukon’s Capability and Consent Board, empowered under 
the Territory’s Care Consent Act, SY 2003, c 21, Sched B for purposes similar to the 
CCB in Ontario.
27. In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, reviews of involuntary admission are conducted 
by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories, and the Nunavut Court of Justice, 
respectively: See NWT Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 26. Both Courts have the authority 
to “make any other order the judge considers appropriate” in addition to confirming or 
canceling the certificates of admission, under s 28(2)(c).
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large tribunal with an extensive jurisprudence.28 Prior to the changes prompted by 
the PS decision, the CCB’s jurisdiction to review civil commitment was narrowly 
defined, much as is the case with other provinces’ review tribunals. It could order 
that involuntary detention continue or that involuntary status be rescinded 
and the individual released. In 2010, the Ontario legislature gave the CCB the 
jurisdiction to order that an individual detained involuntarily be transferred to 
another facility at certain points after at least nine months of civil commitment.29
D. THE DECISION
1. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
PS brought a habeas corpus application to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
seeking, among other things, a declaration that his rights had been violated 
under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter. Justice McCarthy held that the decision 
in Starnaman had “conclusively” determined that the Mental Health Act does 
not offend against the procedural component of the principles of fundamental 
justice.30 He found that PS had been properly admitted and that the CCB 
had regularly reviewed his involuntary status.31 Justice McCarthy found that, 
although PS was detained in a maximum security facility that was excessive for 
his needs, he enjoyed “uncommon” freedoms and privileges that were often 
tailored to his individual needs.32 In rejecting the argument that PS’s security 
interests were infringed, he found that PS had not suffered “any serious state 
imposed psychological harm or stress.”33 He also went on to reject PS’s argument 
that Waypoint’s failure to retain deafness experts to assist in his assessments and 
treatment left him unable to participate meaningfully in his rehabilitation, thereby 
lengthening his detention. Instead, Justice McCarthy found that the record was 
“replete with treatments and opportunities afforded to the Appellant.”34 He 
28. In the 2014-2015 year, the CCB had 123 members, divided roughly equally between 
lawyers, psychiatrists and members of the public. The Board convened 3,586 hearings. See 
Consent and Capacity Board, Annual Report of the CCB for 2014-2015, (Ottawa: Consent 
and Capacity Board 2015), online: CCB <http://www.ccboard.on.ca/>.
29. Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 39.2. This provision was repealed as part of 
the amendments made following the Court of Appeal’s decision in PS, amendments that 
included giving the CCB the power to order transfers for those subject to a “certificate of 
continuation.” See discussion in Part II below.
30. Scott v Her Majesty the Queen, 2013 ONSC 2970 at para 43, 229 ACWS (3d) 259.
31. Ibid at para 45.
32. Ibid at para 69.
33. Ibid at para 72.
34. Ibid at para 76.
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concluded his section 7 analysis by rejecting the argument that PS had merely 
been warehoused, and found that the evidence indicated that he had enjoyed a 
variety of opportunities and freedoms, transfer options had been explored, and 
that PS’s own failure to take action to initiate a transfer had contributed to his 
remaining at Waypoint.35 Accordingly, he held that the impugned provisions of 
the Mental Health Act and the actions of Waypoint had not infringed section 7 
of the Charter.36
PS based his challenge under section 15(1) of the Charter on an allegation 
of discrimination on the ground of physical disability, specifically deafness. 
He presented evidence demonstrating that, throughout his nineteen years 
of involuntary committal, therapeutic interactions with him had generally 
been carried out without the provision of ASL interpreters. Justice McCarthy 
concluded that the Supreme Court of Canada’s seminal ruling in Eldridge v British 
Columbia (Attorney General),37 in which the Court held that equality required 
public hospitals to provide interpreters for deaf patients as part of delivering 
medical services, applied to PS’s circumstances. However, he interpreted the 
Eldridge principle as requiring interpretation only for “significant therapeutic 
interventions,”38 which he believed had occurred on four specified occasions, 
all prior to 2006. On none of those occasions, he noted, were the breaches 
“intentional.”39 At worst, PS was simply in an inappropriate facility for his needs. 
Justice McCarthy found no violations of section 15(1) since that time, and made 
no declaration with respect to section 15(1).
2. THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL
PS appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. With respect to section 
7, the Court of Appeal began by making a distinction between those individuals 
who are civilly committed for less than six months (roughly 98%), and those who 
are civilly committed for more than six months (roughly 2%).40 Relying on these 
statistics, the Court held that the focus of the CCB is on short-term committal 
and whether the patient meets the criteria for commitment.41 However, when 
35. Ibid at para 86.
36. Ibid at para 103.
37. [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 DLR (4th) 577.
38. Supra note 30 at para 103 [emphasis added].
39. Scott v Her Majesty the Queen, supra note 30 at para 100.
40. PS, supra note 9 at para 26.
41. Ibid at para 193.
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commitments extend beyond six months, the Charter requires that the CCB have 
additional powers to deal with those commitments.42
The Court acknowledged the significant deprivation of liberty involved in civil 
commitment. Even where protection of the public requires detention, “the state 
cannot detain people for significant periods of time without providing them with 
a fair procedural process.”43 The Court acknowledged that the greater the impact 
on the liberty of the individual the greater the need for procedural protections and 
that “factual situations which are closer or analogous to criminal proceedings will 
merit greater vigilance by the courts.”44 This finding was particularly significant 
because it enabled the Court to rely heavily on jurisprudence involving various 
provincial Criminal Code Review Boards in which concerns around the liberty 
interests of the accused have been much more front and centre than in the civil 
commitment context. Criminal Code Review Boards have the power to impose 
conditions that relate to the provision of medical services and treatment and, 
by analogy, so must tribunals that review civil commitment:
In sum, the case law suggests that in the non-punitive detention context, s. 7 requires 
the body reviewing detention to have the procedures and powers necessary to render 
a decision that is minimally restrictive on liberty in light of the circumstances 
necessitating the detention.45
By failing to give the CCB the necessary tools to protect the liberty interests 
of long-term involuntary detainees, the Mental Health Act failed to ensure 
that “the liberty interest of the [detained individual is] built into the statutory 
framework.”46 Specifically, the Court held that the CCB lacked the jurisdiction 
“to supervise security level, privileges, therapy and treatment of long-term 
detainees and to craft orders that would ensure an appropriate balance between 
public protection and the protection of detainees’ liberty interests.”47
The Court rejected the argument that the CCB’s new jurisdiction to transfer 
those held involuntarily, conferred by the 2010 amendments, was sufficient to 
uphold the legislation under section 7. The CCB had no authority to order that 
the individual be transferred to a different level of security within a detaining 
42. Ibid at paras 128-29, 197.
43. Ibid at para 78 citing R v Kobzar, 2012 ONCA 326 at para 57, 110 OR (3d) 671.
44. Ibid at para 79 citing Dehghani v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] 1 
SCR 1053 at 1077, 101 DLR (4th) 654.
45. Ibid at para 92.
46. Ibid at para 115 citing Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v Ontario (Attorney General), 
2004 SCC 20 at para 53, [2004] 1 SCR 498.
47. Ibid at para 115.
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institution, to transfer the individual to another hospital with conditions, 
or to increase access to the community or order conditions to prepare for gradual 
release.48 One example of the inadequacy of the CCB’s powers was the fact that 
the Mental Health Act did not give it “the power to issue a community treatment 
order as an alternative to detention for an individual certified as an involuntary 
patient.”49 The Court held that the Mental Health Act must provide the CCB with 
sufficient flexibility to ensure that individuals are not subjected to overly restrictive 
or prolonged detentions and to make sure that the individual’s treatment is 
moving them towards reintegration into society. The Court envisaged a review 
mechanism that would allow the CCB to examine basic questions as to “where 
and how a person is detained and how they are discharged into the community.”50
The Court crafted a simple but elegant remedy in this case, pursuant to 
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.51 Rather than invalidating the whole 
civil commitment regime, it focused on the provisions that provided for renewals 
beyond six months. It struck out the words “or subsequent,” thus disallowing 
renewals beyond six months.52 Section 20(4), as modified by the Court’s order 
provided as follows:
An involuntary patient may be detained, restrained, observed and examined in a 
psychiatric facility,
a. for not more than two weeks under a certificate of involuntary admission; and
b. for not more than,
i. one additional month under a first certificate of renewal,
ii. two additional months under a second certificate of renewal, and
iii.  three additional months53
Because the Board only had jurisdiction to order a transfer after 
approximately nine months, the Court held that the transfer provision would 
no longer be applicable because individuals could not be committed for nine 
48. Ibid at para 126.
49. Ibid. As will be discussed in Part III B, this is one deficiency identified by the Court of 
Appeal that was not addressed in the Ontario government’s amendments.
50. Ibid at para 127.
51. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
52. Ibid at para 202.
53. Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 20(4) [strike-out added to reflect the Court’s 
order]. The Court apparently overlooked the fact that the remedy ordered here actually 
allows for commitment beyond six months since there is the initial two weeks, followed by 
one month, an additional two months, and finally three more months add up to a total of six 
months and two weeks.
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months. The Court left for another day the question of whether problems of the 
kind encountered in this case could arise in short-term civil commitment.54 It 
suspended the operation of its remedy for a period of twelve months so that the 
Ontario government could consider how to revise its legislative regime.55
With respect to the equality rights claim, again the Court of Appeal 
unanimously found in PS’s favour. The Court rejected the “significant intervention” 
test as being too narrow for this form of discrimination. It stated that properly 
interpreted, Eldridge had established a threshold of “effective communication,” 
and that in the context of civil commitment, this had a particularly strong 
content. Justice Sharpe described the implications as follows:
I note here that s. 15(1) does not require “24/7” interpretation services for all 
aspects of daily living, but in the context of involuntary detention, it certainly does 
require a degree of accommodation beyond the context of significant therapeutic 
services and interactions. In Eldridge, the court held, at para. 82, that the “‘effective 
communication’ standard is a flexible one, and will take into consideration such 
factors as the complexity and importance of the information to be communicated, 
the context in which the communications will take place and the number of people 
involved.” The means for effective communication does not have to be provided at 
all times and in every situation.
However, statutorily-mandated detention renders detainees entirely dependent 
upon the hospital, whether privately or publicly operated, for essential services and 
treatment. In my view, in the context of detention, the flexible Eldridge standard 
of “effective communication” mandates the regular provision of communication 
through deaf appropriate services in order to ensure that the detainees’ basic and 
fundamental personal needs are being fully understood and consistently addressed.56
The Court went on to say that the applications judge had erred by finding 
violations of PS’s section 15 rights only on isolated occasions, in the face of 
evidence that hospital authorities had relied for years on written communication 
with PS despite being aware that he was functionally illiterate and required ASL 
interpretation for comprehension. The Court made a particular point of noting 
the importance of using interpreters for effective communication of requests for 
consent to treatment, something the facility had consistently failed to do.
With respect to its ruling that PS’s equality rights had been consistently and 
unjustifiably violated over a period of years, the Court awarded declaratory relief 
as follows, pursuant to the remedial power in section 24(1) of the Charter:
54. PS, supra note 9 at para 204.
55. Ibid at para 206.
56. Ibid at paras 147-148.
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1. that the appellant’s s. 15(1) rights have been violated, and
2.  setting out in general terms the nature and extent of his entitlement under s. 15(1), 
namely, that Ontario and Waypoint are required to provide the necessary and 
appropriate communication services that will ensure: (i) that the appellant’s basic 
and fundamental personal needs as a detainee are fully understood and addressed, 
and (ii) that the appellant is able to communicate effectively to access the therapeutic, 
treatment and other programs offered to hearing detainees.57
PS represents the most fulsome elaboration by a Canadian appellate court 
of the Eldridge principles with respect to access to equal public services by deaf 
persons, and indeed by persons with disabilities generally.
E. NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PS V ONTARIO
Since PS has binding force only in Ontario, why should academics and lawyers 
outside the province still take heed of this decision? While the mental health 
regime in Ontario is unique, features of Ontario’s legislation germane to the 
reasoning in PS are common to most provincial and territorial mental health 
statutes.58 In other words, the shortcomings identified by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in PS exist across the country. Every province and territory provides for 
civil commitment that can last longer than six months.59 For example, in British 
Columbia, an individual can be detained for one month, renewed for a second 
month, then three months followed by an unlimited number of six-month 
57.  Ibid at para 207.
58.  We confine our general remarks to Canada’s common law jurisdictions. Mental health law 
in Québec has distinct features owing both to its civil law system and the role of an omnibus 
administrative tribunal, the Administrative Tribunal of Québec (ATQ). Civil mental health 
law in Québec is governed By provisions of that province’s Civil Code of Québec, CQLR c 
CCQ-1991, the Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c C-25, and the Protection Act, supra note 1. 
Beyond an initial 72 hour period of hospital confinement, a person is subject to involuntary 
admission only by virtue of a court order, and for a period specified by the court (subject 
to renewal). The individual may seek a review of the order of confinement before the ATQ, 
the tribunal that conducts administrative reviews across many areas of public governance in 
Québec. The ATQ also acts as the forensic review board in Québec for purposes of Part XX.1 
(“Mental Disorder”) of the Criminal Code, supra note 18.
59. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 24(1)(c); Alberta Mental Health Act, supra note 1, 
s 8(3)(c); Saskatchewan Mental Health Services Act, supra note 1, ss 24.5(1); Manitoba Mental 
Health Act, supra note 1, s 21(4); Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 20(4)(b); Civil 
Code of Québec, supra note 58; Nova Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, supra note 
1, s 22; New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 13(1)(c); Newfoundland, Mental 
Health Care and Treatment Act, supra note 1, s 31(1)(c); PEI Mental Health Act, supra note 1, 
ss 16(3), 16(3)(c); Yukon Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 16(1); NWT Mental Health Act, 
supra note 1, s 23.2(1); Nunavut Mental Health Act (Nunavut), supra note 1, s 23.2(1).
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renewals.60 Nova Scotia is similar except no single renewal is for more than three 
months.61 None of these jurisdictions puts a limit on how long a person can be 
detained. Some provinces provide a role for the tribunal in reviewing treatment 
decisions62 while others limit their tribunals to reviewing the status of civil 
commitment and release.63 In British Columbia, for example, the civil review 
tribunal only has the jurisdiction to review detention, although this extends to 
those on extended leave.64 Unlike in Ontario, the BC statute gives the review 
panel no jurisdiction whatsoever regarding treatment which, for those with 
involuntary status, can be imposed without consent.65 Further, no provincial 
mental health legislation in Canada provides the kind of jurisdiction envisaged 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in PS to supervise the conditions of long-term 
commitment. Nor does any provincial review tribunal, outside of Ontario, 
have the authority to transfer the individual to another facility, although 
Prince Edward Island and the Yukon provide for review of a physician’s transfer 
decision,66 and New Brunswick requires the review tribunal to approve transfers 
to another jurisdiction.67 The legislative amendments made in Ontario following 
the judgement in PS—discussed below in Part II—mean that Ontario is now 
the only province in Canada that provides significant procedural protections to 
long-term civilly committed individuals.
We have seen small steps towards expanding the jurisdiction of review 
tribunals in some provinces. Nova Scotia, for example, allows the Review Board 
60. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 24(1).
61. Nova Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, supra note 1, s 22.
62. Manitoba Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 30(5); PEI Mental Health Act, supra 
note 1, s 24(4).
63. See, for example, BC (Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 25(2)) and Saskatchewan (Mental 
Health Services Act, supra note 1, s 34(8)).
64. BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, ss 25(2), 39(1). Extended leave refers to the practice in 
British Columbia of releasing people from a psychiatric facility where they retain the status of 
being detained involuntarily. Such individuals may be brought back into the hospital at any 
time without any procedural protections and continue to be subject to treatment without 
consent, which is allowed for all those who are civilly committed in British Columbia. 
Individuals on extended leave continue to have access to the Review Panel but the Mental 
Health Act puts no limit on the length of time an individual can be on extended leave.
65. Ibid s 31.
66. PEI Mental Health Act, supra note 1, 28(1)(g); Yukon Mental Health Act, supra 
note 1, s 24(2).
67. New Brunswick Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 27. New Brunswick has a somewhat 
unique regime in which a physician must apply to the Review Board in order to have a 
person admitted to a psychiatric facility, although the person may be detained and treated 
pending the tribunal’s decision.
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to assess community treatment orders.68 In general, when the Review Board is 
considering an application to review detention or a community treatment order, 
it may make “such recommendations to the chief executive officer as it sees fit 
respecting the treatment or care of a patient.”69 However, the statute stops short 
of giving the Board the jurisdiction to make orders regarding treatment or other 
conditions of detention as the chief executive officer is not required to implement 
any of the recommendations made by the tribunal.70 Prince Edward Island has a 
unique provision guaranteeing certain communication rights on the part of the 
detained individual, and the tribunal can review denial of those rights.71 Despite 
these exceptions, no province outside Ontario has enacted the kinds of powers 
required as a matter of constitutional law by PS. No provincial tribunal has, for 
example, the power to order transfers to lower levels of custody, the power to 
release an individual on conditions or on a community treatment order rather 
than prolonging detention, the power to scrutinize an individual’s freedom of 
movement within the facility and its surrounding community, or the power 
to scrutinize treatment plans to ensure that the individual is making progress 
towards reintegration into the community. PS provides important ammunition 
for challenging all these shortcomings in provincial and territorial regimes.
II. A NEW ROLE FOR ONTARIO’S CONSENT AND CAPACITY 
BOARD
Having outlined the PS decision and its national significance, we wish to explore 
the significance of the ruling in PS for enhanced administrative supervision of the 
civil mental health systems in Ontario and all common law provinces. We focus 
on the systemic section 7 issue, rather than on the individualized section 15 claim 
that was unique to PS’s case.
We begin by demonstrating that the most significant aspect of the Court’s 
decision was its reliance on the Criminal Code Review Board jurisprudence. 
We then move on to examine the response to PS recently enacted by the Ontario 
government and demonstrate that, while progressive and important for long-term 
detainees, it stops short of fully vindicating section 7 liberty interests and may 
even raise its own section 15 concerns for persons civilly committed for shorter 
periods of time. Finally, we suggest that the Court’s reasoning might imply a 
68. Nova Scotia Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, supra note 1, ss 58, 76(2)(f ).
69. Ibid, s 68(2).
70. Ibid.
71. PEI Mental Health Act, supra note 1, ss 33(2), 28(1)(h).
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broader role for administrative tribunals in the mental health field. Specifically, 
we raise the possibility of according review responsibility to tribunals with respect 
to important liberty interests of civilly committed individuals that are put in 
jeopardy by ongoing use of measures such as physical restraint and seclusion. 
In turn, this leads us to a brief consideration of an issue raised but not resolved 
in PSthe jurisdiction of mental health review tribunals to address and remedy 
breaches of a civilly committed individual’s Charter rights. In our view, a move in 
the direction of  increased independent review of security measures and discharge 
planning is overdue. Such broad jurisdiction would respond more appropriately 
to the constitutional interests of liberty and security of person of individuals 
involuntarily detained in psychiatric facilities across Canada.
A. RELIANCE ON THE CRIMINAL CODE REVIEW BOARD MODEL
In 1991, Isabel Grant argued that the coercive nature of civil commitment 
becomes clearer when analogies are made to the deprivations of liberty involved 
in the criminal justice system.72 In PS, the Ontario Court of Appeal took a step in 
that direction by relying heavily on Criminal Code Review Board jurisprudence, 
thus revitalizing the judicial understanding of civil commitment. In our view this 
is the most significant implication of the decision. The Court’s reliance on case 
law dealing with the Criminal Code Review Boards, tribunals established in each 
province under the Criminal Code to make decisions regarding persons found not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR) or unfit to stand trial, 
enables the Court to recognize the serious deprivation of liberty involved in civil 
commitment. This is in sharp contrast to the approach taken by Justice Donald of 
the British Columbia Supreme Court in McCorkell, an earlier Charter challenge 
to the criteria justifying civil commitment.73 In McCorkell, Justice Donald applied 
a much more paternalistic approach to civil commitment, justifying the lack of 
procedural protections on the basis that the system is aimed at helping people 
who are sick. The analogy to criminal law procedural protections was not relevant 
to the civil commitment context because of these different rationales:
72. Isabel Grant, “Mental Health Law and the Courts” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall LJ 747. Grant’s 
paper was written before the creation of the Criminal Code Review Board and thus the 
author focused on criminal law more broadly. Since that time, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has differentiated the Criminal Code Review Board from the criminal trial process more 
broadly because of its inquisitorial nature. See Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute, [1999] 
2 SCR 625, 175 DLR (4th) 193 [Winko]. However, the PS court focuses its analysis on the 
connection between the Criminal Code Review Board and mental health tribunals.
73. McCorkell, supra note 7.
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It is necessary at this point to repeat what I said earlier concerning the use 
of criminal cases to decide a mental health matter: the objects and purposes of 
criminal law and mental health legislation are so different that cases in one area will 
be of little guidance in the other. A protective statute and a penal statute operate 
in dramatically dissimilar contexts. Strict and narrow criteria for the detention of 
persons in a criminal law context reflect our society’s notions of fundamental justice 
for an accused person and protection of the public is a foremost consideration. 
But in the field of mental health, the same criteria would defeat the purpose of the 
legislation which is to help seriously mentally ill people in need of protection.74
The McCorkell Court failed to recognize that even a statute with a protective 
purpose can have the same effect on the individual as a punitive statute and thus 
should trigger the same liberty interests.75
Two years prior to McCorkell, the law concerning the criminal or forensic 
psychiatric system had been sent on a new trajectory. In R v Swain,76 the Supreme 
Court of Canada ruled that the Criminal Code provisions that provided for 
immediate and indefinite detention of a person found to have been NCR at the 
time of an offence, without assessment of their mental condition at the time of 
disposition, unjustifiably infringed both sections 7 and 9 of the Charter. The 
Court’s decision in Swain effectively endorsed a package of reform measures 
enacted shortly thereafter as Section XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the “Mental 
Disorder” provisions. Central to the reform package was the constitution of 
Review Boards at the provincial level to supervise the progress of NCR detainees 
in the forensic psychiatric hospital system. These Boards have authority to rule 
on issues of discharge, conditions of discharge, security levels within hospital 
custody, and treatment planning.
In PS, the Ontario Court of Appeal revisited and relied on the reasoning in 
Swain. In particular, the Court found that the Supreme Court’s understanding 
of the procedural aspects of fundamental justice in circumstances where the 
state detains individuals were applicable to civil commitment, at least so far as it 
relates to those detained involuntarily. The Court of Appeal cited the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s 2007 decision in Charkaoui et al v Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration)77 concerning the statutory scheme for detaining and deporting 
non-citizens believed to pose national security threats to Canada, quoting in 
74. Ibid at 48.
75. See e.g. Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR 
(4th) 1; Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, 
[2011] 3 SCR 134.
76. [1991] 1 SCR 933, 5 CR (4th) 253 [Swain].
77. 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350.
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particular the Court’s statement that section 7 requires that detention for an 
extended period “must be accompanied by a meaningful process of review that 
takes into account the context and circumstances of the individual case.”78
In the twenty-five years following Swain, Canadian courts have recognized 
that forensic review boards play an important role in protecting the liberty 
interests of NCR accused and those found unfit to stand trial. In fact, the Charter 
jurisdiction of Canadian administrative tribunals in general was confirmed in a 
decision involving the Ontario Criminal Code Review Board (the Review Board). 
In R v Conway,79 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Review Board had 
jurisdiction to decide issues of law and thus had Charter jurisdiction. The Court 
described the broad role of the Review Board in these terms:
The Board is a quasi-judicial body with significant authority over a vulnerable 
population. It is unquestionably authorized to decide questions of law. It was 
established by, and operates under, Part XX.I of the Criminal Code as a specialized 
statutory tribunal with ongoing supervisory jurisdiction over the treatment, 
assessment, detention and discharge of those accused who have been found not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (“NCR patient”).80
Criminal Code Review Boards regularly assess the levels of custody in which 
an individual is detained and the level of privileges an individual is afforded. 
By contrast, civil tribunals rarely have any jurisdiction to assess whether the 
hospitalization is doing anything positive for the individual or moving him or 
her closer to discharge. PS provided a stark demonstration of the impact that the 
lack of a similar jurisdiction has on the civil side of the mental health system in 
Ontario. Year after year the CCB reported that PS did not require placement in 
maximum security and yet he continued to be detained, untreated, in maximum 
security: an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that the CCB was powerless 
to address. It took a case about psychiatric gating, arising out of the criminal 
justice system, to get the Court to explicitly acknowledge the connection between 
coercive deprivations of liberty in the criminal system and coercive deprivations 
of liberty through civil commitment.
78. Ibid at para 107.
79. 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765 [Conway].
80. Ibid at para 84 (per Abella J). Note that in Conway, the Supreme Court ruled that 
even though the Review Board had Charter jurisdiction and was a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” for the purposes of section 24(1), its remedial authority under that provision 
was limited to the orders it was authorized to make by its parent statute i.e., the Criminal 
Code. This is a further limitation on the scope of tribunal jurisdiction in Charter matters that 
complicates the field.
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The Review Board’s powers with respect to scrutinizing treatment decisions 
are not explicitly set-out in the Criminal Code, but rather are inferred from 
the Review Board’s broad jurisdiction to make decisions about the risk the 
accused presents to the community and about reintegrating the accused into 
the community.81 This supervisory power given to the Review Board was not 
inevitable but rather the result of deliberate choices by the courts. For example, 
in Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services),82 
the Supreme Court upheld the BC Review Board’s order that the treating 
hospital develop a comprehensive treatment plan for the detained individual 
and “undertake assertive efforts to enroll the accused in a culturally appropriate 
treatment program.”83 While Mazzei made clear that it was not the job of the 
BC Review Board to prescribe specific treatments, the Court held that “Review 
Boards have the power to bind hospital authorities and to impose binding 
conditions regarding or supervising (but not prescribing or imposing) medical 
treatment for an NCR accused.”84 The role of the Review Board is to make sure 
that there is an appropriate treatment plan in place that is moving the individual 
towards reintegration in the community.85
81. It is important to acknowledge that Parliament has made significant revisions to the 
disposition provisions that are applied by the Review Board, most significantly removing 
the requirement that the Review Board impose the least restrictive option when imposing a 
disposition. Now the Review Board is instructed to give priority to the safety of the public 
and the accused’s liberty interest has been given less weight. This is particularly problematic 
given the Supreme Court of Canada’s reliance on the least restrictive requirement to uphold 
the disposition provisions under the Charter in Winko, supra note 72. It remains to be seen 
how this change will affect the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction. For further discussion, 
see Lisa Grantham, “Bill C-14: A Step Backwards for the Rights of Mentally Disordered 
Offenders in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2014) 19 Appeal 63.
82. 2006 SCC 7, [2006] 1 SCR 326 [Mazzei].
83. Ibid at para 4.
84. Ibid at para 7.
85. We are not suggesting that the plight of individuals detained in the forensic system is 
ideal by any means nor that an expansive approach to Review Board jurisdiction has been 
a panacea for all the problems of the forensic system. Kaiser laments the long periods of 
detention that the courts appear to be willing to tolerate in the forensic context and the 
refusal to consider proportionality as a limiting factor, stating that “some accused face huge 
obstacles in obtaining the kind of treatment they desire, and the promise of eventual liberty 
and reintegration remains unfulfilled for them.” Conway himself had spent 26 years in 
custody. H Archibald Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory for Not Criminally Responsible 
Accused” (2010) 75 CR (6th) 241 at 241 [Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory”]. See also 
H Archibald Kaiser, “Mazzei: Constrained Progress in Construing Review Board Powers” 
(2006) 36 CR (6th) 37.
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The fact that the Court of Appeal in PS was willing to consider the Criminal 
Code Review Board jurisprudence opens the door to a much higher level of scrutiny 
of the individual’s liberty interests in the civil commitment context. We argue that 
the forensic model is the most appropriate model for common law jurisdictions 
to ensure adequate protection of those interests. The power of the Review Board 
to, for example, ensure that the individual has an appropriate treatment plan 
would not appear to have impeded physicians in treating individuals found not 
criminally responsible or unfit to stand trial. Rather, this jurisdiction has served 
as a check on the unfettered powers of the treating psychiatrists and hospital 
administrators. Counsel for Ontario in PS had argued that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in R v Conception86—which recognized a forensic hospital’s limited 
right to refuse to accept an individual referred to in under the Criminal Code—
supported the idea that hospital personnel have plenary authority over treatment 
decision-making. Justice Sharpe rejected this argument:
Conception certainly does not detract from the long line of authority discussed above 
as to the need for ongoing supervisory review of the treatment of NCR accused and 
those found unfit to stand trial: see Mazzei, at paras. 40-41, and Penetanguishene, 
at para. 67. Nor does it stand for the proposition advanced by Ontario that by 
conferring discretion on health care professionals, a statute such as the MHA can 
somehow avoid the need for an effective review mechanism.87
In our view, the decision in PS was made possible by the recognition that 
significant deprivations of liberty by the state in the civil commitment context 
are analogous to those in the forensic context where someone is being detained 
in the absence of a criminal conviction. In other words, the Court recognized 
the coercive nature of civil commitment regardless of whether it is used for the 
purported benefit of the individual or the state. The notion that someone who 
has been civilly committed has fewer liberty interests at stake than does someone 
in the forensic system simply because the former has not been charged with a 
crime cannot be justified.
B. THE ONTARIO GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO PS
1. THE AMENDMENTS
Ontario had a number of options open to it in response to the decision in PS. 
It could have simply done nothing and allowed the suspended declaration of 
invalidity to take effect thus prohibiting civil commitment beyond six months. 
86. 2014 SCC 60, [2014] 3 SCR No 82 [Conception].
87. PS, supra note 9 at para 121.
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Doing nothing was likely an unpopular option with the government because it 
would raise the possibility that individuals who were identified as dangerous, but 
who had been detained longer than six months, would have to be decertified as 
soon as the declaration of invalidity took effect. Ontario could also have given the 
CCB more powers in relation to all civilly committed individuals regardless of how 
long they are detained, or in relation to all individuals who are hospitalized in a 
psychiatric facility for more than six months, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Extending the CCB’s powers in either of these ways would have gone beyond the 
strict requirements of PS, but would have been preferable solutions.
Instead, the Ontario government designed a solution that was limited to 
individuals civilly committed for periods longer than the six months allowed 
by PS. The solution took the form of section 20(1.1) of the Mental Health Act, 
which created a new mechanism, a “certificate of continuation,” to authorize 
the continued detention of those who have reached the maximum of three 
“certificates of renewal” of civil commitment under section 20(4), adding up to 
six months’ detention following an initial period of two weeks.88 The criteria for 
a certificate of continuation are the same as for civil commitment. Certificates of 
continuation authorize detention for a further three months and can be renewed 
an indefinite number of times. With respect to each certificate of continuation or 
renewal, the committed individual or his or her representative may apply to the 
CCB to determine whether the committal criteria continue to be met. As with 
certificates of renewal, the Board may rescind a certificate of continuation should 
it find that committal criteria are not met.89 The statute also provides that an 
application for review shall be deemed to be made by a detained individual 
on the completion of a first certificate of continuation and every fourth such 
certificate thereafter.90
The centerpiece of the amendments is found in the new section 41.1(2) 
of the Mental Health Act. It states that, should the Board confirm a certificate 
of continuation, the detained individual or someone on his or her behalf may 
request the Board to make one or more of the following orders:
1. Transfer the patient to another psychiatric facility … but only if the 
patient does not object.
2. Place the patient on a leave of absence for a designated period on 
the advice of a physician […]
88. Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, ss. 20(1.1) and (4).
89.  Ibid, ss 41(3) and (4).
90.  Ibid, s 39(4). Section 39(5) provides that a patient cannot waive deemed applications.
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3. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the 
patient with a different security level or different privileges within 
or outside the psychiatric facility.
4. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to allow the 
patient to be provided with supervised or unsupervised access 
to the community.
5. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the 
patient with vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative services.91
The Board may make any or all of these orders on its own motion, but is 
expressly barred from making any other order.92 Section 42(2) lists the parties to 
a hearing on a certificate of continuation, including the Minister should he or she 
wish to appear, and provides that parties may seek a variance of the Board’s orders 
during a continuation period on the basis of a change “in material circumstances.” 
Barring such a change, an individual can make only one application under section 
41.1(2) every 12 months.93
The CCB is required to impose the order that is the least restrictive given the 
circumstances justifying detention.94 It must consider public safety, the facility’s 
ability to manage and care for the individual, the individual’s mental condition, 
his or her reintegration into society, and any other needs of the individual. The 
Board has no jurisdiction to require a physician to provide treatment,95 although 
it may order an independent assessment of the individual’s “mental condition or 
his or her vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative needs.”96 As an extraordinary 
precaution, the amendments provide that the officer in charge of the facility may 
take an action contrary to an order of the CCB for a period of up to seven days.97 
To extend the action any further, the officer in charge must apply “promptly” to 
the CCB to cancel or vary the Board’s order.98 Ontario has not given its tribunal 
the power to issue a community treatment order as an alternative to detention, 
a power the PS Court specifically found to be lacking.99
91. Ibid, s 41.1(2).
92. Ibid at s 41.1(2).
93. Ibid, s 39(7).
94. Ibid, s 41.1(3). This is particularly striking given that the Harper government amended the 
Criminal Code provisions dealing with the Review Board such that the Review Board no 
longer is required to grant the least restrictive disposition. Criminal Code, supra note 18, 
s 672.54, as amended by SC 2014, c 6, s 9.
95. Ibid, s 41.1(4).
96. Ibid, s 41.1(8).
97. Ibid, s 41.2(1).
98. Ibid, s 41.2(2).
99. PS, supra note 9 at para 127.
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2. ASSESSING ONTARIO’S RESPONSE
In our view, the amendments offer a narrow resolution of the constitutional 
problems identified by the Court with respect to section 7 of the Charter. The 
legislature has granted the CCB a form of supervisory authority in treatment 
planning for long-term detainees. In so doing, Ontario has further distinguished 
its mental health legislation from that of other provinces in the area of protection 
of a detained  individual’s rights. Ontario stands out as a leader when it comes to 
protecting the liberty interests of long-term detainees. However, the amendments 
are couched in terms that limit the positive impact they might otherwise have. 
We have two primary concerns. First, the government has failed to address the 
fact that the line between involuntary and voluntary detention is not always clear 
and that manipulation of this distinction can undermine the new protections 
granted. Second, we have serious concerns about limiting the scope of procedural 
protections to those who are detained for periods longer than six months.
There is considerable potential to manipulate a detained individual’s status 
as voluntary or involuntary.100 Decertifying an individual may be a technique 
used to render a legal dispute moot and, in the context of these new provisions, 
could be used to deny access to the enhanced powers of the CCB that accompany 
a certificate of continuation. In PS specifically, the applicant lost his access to 
the CCB because he was decertified and made “voluntary” even though he 
was told he would be certified as involuntary if he tried to leave the facility.101 
This problem can arise even in the absence of deliberate manipulation of the 
system. An individual’s mental state may vary over time justifying periods of 
decertification to voluntary status. Many individuals, like PS, may have their 
status changed more than once during a hospitalization; others may have brief 
periods in the community over the course of what is otherwise a long-term 
hospitalization. This potential for movement between statuses raises important 
concerns. Will even a brief period of decertification after civil commitment trigger 
the civil commitment process again, thus allowing the certificate of continuation 
mechanism to be avoided? The Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly ruled out the 
possibility that an individual could be decertified before six months and then 
immediately recertified to start the clock running again:
Needless to say, it would not be acceptable to circumvent the time-limited 
duration of a committal by simply restarting the process with a new certificate of 
100. Ontario Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on General Government, Official Report 
of Debates (Hansard), No G-37 (30 November 2015) at 786, 787-788.
101. Ibid at para 40.
GRANT, CARVER,  PS V ONTARIO 1023
involuntary admission upon the expiry of the three-month period contemplated by 
s. 20(4)(b)(iii).102
While the Court indicated that such a practice would not be an appropriate 
response to its ruling, there is nothing in the statute that prevents such status 
changes. Given that any one individual may go back and forth between the 
two statuses, it would be desirable to have some mechanism to review the 
circumstances of anyone who has been hospitalized for more than six months, 
regardless of their status.103 Given that the incidence of long-term psychiatric 
hospitalizations has decreased significantly in recent decades, the safeguard 
should not be prohibitively expensive.104
While Ontario has improved the plight of long-term detainees, it has not 
closed the door to further litigation over the procedures for review of civil 
commitments of less than six months. In our view, limiting the amendments to 
long-term involuntary commitment has only created uncertainty and puts an 
undue onus on persons who are civilly committed for shorter periods of time 
to litigate the scope of their liberty and security interests. The Court’s use of a 
six-month cutoff period (or to put it another way, its restricting the ruling to 
“long-term committals” defined as six months) is open to criticism as arbitrary. 
The Court arrived at this time period by analyzing statistics that demonstrated 
that 98% of individuals are released before six months and only 2% are detained 
beyond six months.105 The Ontario government’s response draws a clear line at 
the six-month cutoff. However, it is not entirely clear why these percentages are 
relevant to the cut-off point for protecting the liberty interests of an individual. 
The fact that only a small number of people are detained beyond six months has 
no coherent connection to the liberty interests of the majority released before 
six months. If an individual does not require maximum security, would it be 
appropriate to detain him or her in that level of custody for five months or even 
one month? If it is unacceptable to deny civilly committed persons appropriate 
treatment tailored to their disability for more than six months, is it acceptable to 
do so for three months? When one considers the revolving door syndrome and 
the fact that people who are detained for short periods may well be readmitted 
102. Ibid at para 203.
103. In the committee hearings about Bill 122, advocacy groups expressed concern about 
individuals who are being held “voluntarily” yet who face the threat of civil commitment. 
Supra note 100.
104. Patricia Sealy & Paul C Whitehead, “Forty Years of Deinstitutionalization of Psychiatric 
Services in Canada: An Empirical Assessment” (2004) 49 Can J Psychiatry 249.
105. PS, supra note 9 at para 26.
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subsequently, many individuals may spend long periods of time civilly committed 
without any effective mechanism of review of the conditions of that detention.106 
The Court left these questions for another day given that PS had been detained 
for nineteen years. However, the Court’s rationale applies just as persuasively to 
review tribunals that are considering shorter-term commitments and reviewing 
individuals who are on extended leave or released on CTOs. We can think of no 
other context in which deprivations of liberty are allowed to continue unchecked 
for up to six months before the full panoply of section 7 rights takes effect.107 
The PS Court recognized that by limiting its analysis to long-term detention, 
it opened the door to future challenges to the constitutionality of the failure to 
have an administrative tribunal with a broad-based supervisory role for shorter 
periods of commitment.
There are two arguments against extending the CCB jurisdiction to all civil 
commitments. The first is that because the number of short-term commitments 
is much larger, the cost would correspondingly increase. We do not feel this is 
an acceptable reason to deny the vindication of section 7 rights. The second 
argument against extending jurisdiction to this group of individuals is that it 
might unduly interfere with the treatment goals of the treating physician for 
shorter-term commitments. We believe this problem can be minimized by, for 
example, limiting the number of times an individual can access the extended 
powers of the CCB, just as Ontario has already done for long-term commitments.
106. We note here the more robust view of the Supreme Court of Canada when describing the 
appropriate supervisory role of a Nova Scotia Provincial Court judge in the context of the 
continuing supervision of a “protection order” for a vulnerable adult, authorized by that 
province’s Adult Protection Act RSNS 1989, c 2:
The significance of independent judicial review of state action when a vulnerable adult has 
been deprived, at the instigation of the state, of the right to function autonomously, cannot 
be overstated. The court’s statutorily assigned supervisory role emerges from the adult’s 
vulnerability. The corollary of a judicial determination that an adult is in need of protection is 
a corresponding limitation on that adult’s autonomous decision making and liberty. It is the 
function` of the court to monitor the scope of that limitation. The legislation must, therefore, 
be interpreted in a way which acknowledges the intrusiveness of the determination and offers 
muscular protection from state intervention incompatible with the adult’s welfare.
 Nova Scotia (Minister of Health) v JJ, 2005 SCC 12 at para 23, [2005] 1 SCR 177 
(per Abella J).
107. In the very different context of security certificates under the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an argument by the 
federal government that sought to justify the denial of detention review for foreign nationals 
for a period of six months, finding such a delay to violate fundamental justice under section 
7. Charkaoui et al v Canada, (Citizenship and Immigration), supra note 77, at paras 91-92.
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Given that the distinction between those detained longer than six months and 
those detained for shorter periods is somewhat arbitrary, we are also concerned 
that in limiting its solution to long-term detainees, Ontario may have exposed its 
statute to challenge under section 15 of the Charter, the equality rights provision. 
Ontario’s decision to establish a new set of powers for the CCB with respect 
to individuals subject to continuation certificates creates a “benefit” or, perhaps 
more aptly, a “protection of the law” that is denied to those on shorter periods 
of commitment. This statutory distinction might discriminate on grounds of 
disability in violation of section 15(1) of the Charter. This is ironic given the 
strong equality rights thrust that underpinned PS’s arguments and that was 
vindicated in the Court of Appeal’s striking judgment on the section 15(1) issue. 
The equality rights issue as it concerns long-term and short-term commitments 
is of a different nature. Whereas the issue in an Eldridge-type case is the failure 
of public authorities to accommodate the needs of a disadvantaged group in 
order for them to participate in and enjoy equal benefit and protection of the 
law—what is often referred to as “adverse effect discrimination”108—limiting 
the CCB’s new powers to long-term commitments is more an instance of 
direct discrimination. The distinction is clear on the face of the statute and is 
drawn between different groups of persons with mental disabilities, based on 
their legal status while hospitalized and the length of their stay in a psychiatric 
facility. Jurisprudence on section 15(1) is clear that discrimination claims can 
be based on differential treatment in law between sub-groups sharing the same 
overall enumerated or analogous characteristic.109 The more difficult question in 
a section 15(1) challenge to the denial of access to the protections afforded by 
section 41.1(2) of the Mental Health Act would be whether the distinction is 
discriminatory in the sense of compounding disadvantages experienced by that 
person, through prejudice, stereotyping, or otherwise.110 While the government 
would presumably argue that the additional protections afforded to those subject 
to continuation certificates correspond to a need for enhanced supervision of 
treatment planning past the point of diagnosis and early application of therapeutic 
interventions, this position might be less persuasive with respect to individuals 
108. For discussion of two types of discrimination, see British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Commission) v BCGSEU, [1999] 3 SCR 3, 176 DLR (4th) 1 at paras 19-24.
109. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation 
Board) v Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 SCR 504 [Martin]; Auton (Guardian ad litem of ) 
v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657; Corbiere v Canada 
(Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 173 DLR (4th) 1.
110.  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61, per Abella J writing for a 
majority on this point.
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with a history of frequent or multiple recent involuntary committals. This is 
especially true when considering the newly added power of the CCB to order 
the director of a facility to provide a person with “vocational, interpretation or 
rehabilitative services.”111 It should be noted that this power speaks most directly 
to the equality rights interest raised by the PS case, and can be seen as a means of 
ensuring that those interests are not neglected. The fact that these protections are 
needed for long-term commitments does not inevitably lead to the conclusion 
that they are unnecessary for commitments of less than six months.
This discussion of the equality problem in the amended Ontario legislation 
is not intended to suggest that a section 15 challenge to this otherwise important 
reform legislation is imminent or would be straightforward. But nor can the 
government rely on the PS decision to insulate its distinction between short 
and long-term commitments. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision does 
not mandate such a distinction. The Court was confronted by a man who had 
been civilly committed for nineteen years. It did not need to address short-term 
commitments. It thus limited its judgment based on the six-month cutoff period. 
It explicitly left open the possibility that further protections are necessary for 
short-term commitments. It held that longer-term commitments require more 
protections, but it did not hold that short-term commitments do not.
III. CIVIL REVIEW TRIBUNALS MOVING FORWARD
A. RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION WITHIN PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES
The conclusion in PS that long-term civil commitment requires tribunal review 
of treatment and discharge planning implicitly raises the question of whether 
there are other section 7 liberty interests in civil commitment that call for 
enhanced administrative oversight and review. At least one other area comes 
distinctly within section 7’s ambit: The use of disciplinary or behavioural control 
measures within a hospital setting, particularly the use of physical restraint and 
seclusion. These practices have come under increasing scrutiny in Canada and 
elsewhere, in both prison and hospital settings. In Canada, the 2013 coroner’s 
inquest into the death by self-strangulation of Ashley Smith, a young woman 
with a history of mental health issues who was subjected to extended periods in 
solitary confinement while held in the corrections system, recommended strict 
111. Ontario Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 41.1(2).
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limits on the use of seclusion.112 Two Charter challenges to solitary confinement 
in the prison context have also been initiated, one in British Columbia and one in 
Ontario.113 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has concluded that even short 
periods of seclusion may constitute torture and ill-treatment for people with 
mental disabilities.114 The Special Rapporteur also noted that there can be no 
therapeutic justification for the prolonged use of restraints.115
The use of restraint and seclusion in psychiatric hospital facilities is a 
well-known phenomenon. These measures continue to be used in Canadian 
psychiatric facilities, including in Ontario.116 These measures are subject to 
government and hospital policies and protocols, but concerns have long been 
expressed that the mechanisms for enforcing compliance with policies are 
112. See Correctional Service Canada, “Response to the Coroner’s Inquest Touching the Death 
of Ashley Smith” (11 December 2014), online: Correctional Service Canada <http://www.
csc-scc.gc.ca/publications/005007-9011-eng.shtml#4.0>.
113. See John Ivison, “Group launching legal challenge to limit use of solitary confinement 
in Canadian prisons”, National Post (19 January 2015) online: National Post <http://
news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/group-launching-legal-challenge-to-limit-use-
of-solitary-confinement-in-canadian-prisons>; Sean Fine, “Ontario government 
sued for putting youth in solitary confinement”, Globe and Mail (4 November 
2015) online: Globe and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/
ontario-faces-lawsuit-for-putting-young-offenders-in-solitary-confinement/
article27107663/>.
114. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, UNGAOR, 23rd Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 
(2013) at para 63, online: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.
HRC.22.53_English.pdf>. “The Special Rapporteur has addressed the issue of solitary 
confinement and stated that its imposition, of any duration, on persons with mental 
disabilities is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (A/66/268, paras. 67-68, 78). 
Moreover, any restraint on people with mental disabilities for even a short period of time 
may constitute torture and ill-treatment. It is essential that an absolute ban on all coercive 
and non-consensual measures, including restraint and solitary confinement of people with 
psychological or intellectual disabilities, should apply in all places of deprivation of liberty, 
including in psychiatric and social care institutions.” Ibid.
115. UN General Assembly, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: 
Note by the Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess, UN Doc A/63/175 (2008) at paras 
55-56. The Special Rapporteur notes that there can be no therapeutic justification for the 
prolonged use of restraints, which may amount to torture or ill-treatment. The Special 
Rapporteur also notes that prolonged solitary confinement and seclusion of persons may 
constitute torture or ill treatment.
116. Tina M Mah, et al, “Use of control interventions in adult in-patient mental health services” 
(2015) 28 Healthcare Mgmt Forum 139.
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informal and uneven.117 If additional powers are to be given to mental health 
tribunals, it would seem appropriate to include the ability to review, report on, 
and direct changes with respect to the use of these highly invasive and largely 
unreviewable measures.
B. CHARTER JURISDICTION OF MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNALS
The discussion of restraint and seclusion leads to an issue that was raised before 
the Court of Appeal in PS: whether the tribunal should be given jurisdiction to 
grant section 24(1) Charter remedies. An intervener in PS, the Mental Health 
Legal Committee, asked the Court of Appeal to order that the CCB be given this 
jurisdiction. The Court declined to make such an order, in part because it would 
involve overruling an earlier decision of the Divisional Court.118
The idea of extending Charter jurisdiction to civil mental health tribunals is 
an intriguing one. Section 24(1) authorizes a “court of competent jurisdiction” 
to order such remedies “as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances” to address the breach of an individual’s Charter rights by state 
action.119 The Supreme Court of Canada has stated on several occasions that 
section 24(1) contemplates the power to order creative remedies, responding to 
the wide range of circumstances in which an individual may have his or her 
rights infringed by statutory delegates (but not by legislation).120 The appeal of 
recognizing section 24(1) jurisdiction in a civil mental health tribunal like the 
CCB is that it would permit a flexible response to those situations in which civilly 
committed individual’s Charter rights, including section 7 liberty interests, are 
implicated. It would obviate the need for statutory definition and anticipation of 
117. H Archibald Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental Health Facilities: Assessing 
the Prospects for Improved Access to Justice” (2001) 19 Windsor YB Access Just 391. For a 
recent discussion of the constitutional implications of the use of restraint and seclusion in 
the US, see Jeremy Weltman, Roderick MacLeish and Jacquelyn Bumbaca, “Deference Does 
Not Equal Abdication: Application of Youngberg to Prolonged Seclusion and Restraint of the 
Mentally Ill” (2015) 26 Stan L & Pol’y Rev 239.
118. Ontario (Attorney General) v Jane Patient, [2005] O.J. No. 631, 250 DLR (4th) 697 
[Jane Patient].
119. Supra note 4, s 24(1).
120. See e.g. Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 
3; Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28.
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the myriad circumstances in which such a violation might occur, including such 
circumstances as over-reliance on restraint and seclusion measures.121
This begs the question of how civil mental health tribunals might come to 
possess section 24(1) powers. Civil mental health tribunals will be presumed to 
be “courts of competent jurisdiction” for purposes of section 24(1) provided that 
they have jurisdiction over issues of law.122 That presumption can be rebutted by 
express legislative withdrawal of Charter jurisdiction or by a clear implication 
of such intent derived from statutory limits on a tribunal’s role and logistical 
functioning.123 The legislatures of Alberta and British Columbia have enacted 
blanket provisions withdrawing Charter jurisdiction for most tribunals within 
their jurisdiction, including civil mental health tribunals.124 Ontario has also 
withdrawn Charter jurisdiction from the CCB with respect to civil commitment 
and CTO reviews.125 It would appear then that these tribunals are precluded 
from having the power to order section 24(1) remedies so long as the legislature 
maintains its prohibition.126 However, there is an issue whether this denial of 
Charter jurisdiction to civil mental health tribunals is constitutional and therefore 
121. For an excellent discussion of the Charter jurisdiction of civil and forensic mental health 
review tribunals prior to PS v Ontario, see Joaquin Zuckerberg, “Jurisdiction of Mental 
Health Tribunals to Provide Positive Remedies: Application, Challenges and Prospects” 
(2011) 57:2 McGill LJ 267. Zuckerberg concludes that despite the broadening of Charter 
jurisdiction from administrative tribunals in general, promised by Martin and Conway, 
nothing has significantly changed with respect to civil mental health tribunals. He notes that 
civil mental health tribunals in Canada generally lack the jurisdiction to make rulings about 
ongoing treatment and supervision matters that are granted to forensic review boards under 
the Criminal Code. “Rather,” he states, “their jurisdiction is generally restricted to confirming 
decisions to civilly commit a person and findings of incapacity to consent to medical 
treatment.” Ibid at 281. This underlies the ruling in Jane Patient, supra note 118.
122. Conway, supra note 80 at para 78.
123. Martin, supra note 109.
124. Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, RSA 2000, c A-3, s 11; Designation of 
Constitutional Decision Makers Regulation, AB Reg 69/2006, s 2; Administrative Tribunals Act, 
SBC 2004, c 45, ss 44, 45, and BC Mental Health Act, supra note 1, s 24.2.
125. Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996, c 2, Sched A, s 70.1, enacted pursuant to SO 2006, 
c 19, Sched L, s 2.
126. Kaiser has argued that the logic of Conway extends to provincial mental health tribunals. 
He argues that the availability of the Charter “should provide enhanced access to justice in 
settings where it has been difficult to invoke the protection of the law, let alone the Charter. 
These tribunals vitally affect the dignity, liberty and living conditions of institutionalized 
persons. Before Conway, the exercise of discretion by clinicians and administrators was 
virtually invisible and unchallengeable.” Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory,” supra 
note 85 at 243.
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whether a challenge to that statutory withdrawal could provide tribunals with 
section 24(1) jurisdiction.
In Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin, the Supreme Court 
of Canada based its finding of a rebuttable presumption that tribunals with 
general jurisdiction over questions of law have Charter jurisdiction on the logic 
of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.127 Section 52(1) states that any 
law that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and of no force or effect. 
The Court stated that this means that statutory decision-makers who have the 
authority to interpret and apply law must refuse to enforce a law they deem 
unconstitutional. This is inconsistent with the idea that legislators have carte 
blanche to decide whether any particular tribunal has Charter jurisdiction (or 
constitutional jurisdiction generally), irrespective of the tribunal’s place in the 
legal system, its importance with respect to access to justice, and the breadth of 
its role in interpreting law. Justice Gonthier, writing for the Court in Martin, 
appeared to acknowledge this problem in the following passage:
I refrain, however, from expressing any opinion as to the constitutionality of a 
provision that would place procedural barriers in the way of claimants seeking to 
assert their rights in a timely and effective manner, for instance by removing Charter 
jurisdiction from a tribunal without providing an effective alternative administrative 
route for Charter claims.128
The reference to an “effective alternative administrative route” appears 
not to include recourse to superior courts on constitutional matters, which is 
otherwise always available. As noted by Justice Sharpe in PS, individuals detained 
in psychiatric facilities face particular challenges in asserting their rights and in 
accessing the courts:
In a second and related submission, Ontario argues that where a patient wishes to 
challenge a committal on grounds that fall outside the powers of the CCB, there 
are alternate procedures available to fill any perceived gap. The patient can initiate 
proceedings in the Superior Court, resort to internal complaint procedures within 
the hospital, complain about doctors and nurses to the appropriate professional 
colleges or invoke the process established by the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. H.19, with respect to complaints about a failure to accommodate a disability.
If we were to accept this submission, the appellant, a person who suffers from a 
mental disorder and a serious disability and who is held in a maximum security 
institution, would have to initiate proceedings in two or more different tribunals. 
This solution is fatally flawed; it is legally inadequate and practically unworkable. It 
127. Supra note 51.
128. Martin, supra note 109 at para 44.
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would be prohibitively costly, very slow, seriously inconvenient and almost certainly 
ineffective.129
While Justice Sharpe’s comments were directed to the absence of an 
administrative mechanism to raise issues related to overall treatment planning, 
access to a forum to pursue Charter rights encounters the same barriers for 
individuals confined in a psychiatric facility. A constitutional challenge might 
well be available with respect to the denial of Charter jurisdiction to mental 
health tribunals or to any other administrative agency with supervisory authority 
over psychiatric facilities, if those entities do not provide “effective alternative 
administrative” routes. The arena in which these tribunals and agencies operate 
is one in which Charter rights, particularly section 7 rights, are implicated on 
a regular basis. The populations whose rights are at risk of infringement are 
particularly vulnerable and have limited means to access other avenues for 
recourse or even to access legal counsel.130 Therefore, it might be that the CCB 
and other review tribunals are precisely the kind of entities that should be able to 
rule on and remediate individual Charter breaches.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in PS has the potential to prompt amendments to civil commitment 
statutes across Canada, since no mental health statute currently meets the 
criteria that the Court of Appeal has prescribed. We would hope that provincial 
legislatures would treat this decision as a message that it is time to move towards 
treating civilly committed individuals as rights holders, entitled to the same 
procedural protections as other individuals detained by the state. However, if past 
experience is any indication, doing nothing is the more likely response of most 
provincial legislators, as the rights of civilly detained individuals have rarely been 
given priority. Failure to respond proactively to PS would put the onus on those 
detained in psychiatric facilities to initiate Charter challenges to bring about 
reform. There has been a dearth of litigation regarding mental health tribunals 
outside of Ontario. Even the refusal to allow competent civilly committed 
individuals to decline treatment in British Columbia and Newfoundland, 
129. PS, supra note 9 at paras 118-119.
130. A case has recently been filed in the British Columbia Supreme Court challenging 
the refusal of the Legal Services Society to provide funding for lawyers to represent 
clients before Review Panels under the Mental Health Act. http://bcpiac.com/
mental-health-review-board-legal-aid/.
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a denial that raises serious Charter concerns,131 has not yet been subject to a 
Charter challenge despite the compelling reasoning of the Ontario Court of 
Appeal in Fleming v Reid.132 There are huge institutional barriers to having these 
matters litigated, not the least of which is a profound lack of funding as well as 
difficulties with mootness where potential plaintiffs are decertified or released 
before their cases are heard by a court.133
As a result of the PS decision, the legislative scheme for long-term detainees in 
Ontario has changed for the better. However, the government chose reforms that 
gave rights to the smallest possible number of civilly-committed individuals and 
left open the possibility of manipulating the regime by decertifying individuals 
for a short period of time. A better option for all committals would be to develop 
a civil mental health tribunal with a role and structure similar to that which 
now exists in forensic psychiatric systems across this country. The tribunal should 
have explicit Charter jurisdiction and detained individuals should be guaranteed 
the right to paid counsel. Ontario’s recognition of the need for a tribunal to 
play a role in protecting the liberty interests of long-term involuntarily detained 
individuals should serve as a beacon for that evolution.
131. Simon Verdun-Jones & Michelle Lawrence, “The Charter Right to Refuse Psychiatric 
Treatment: A Comparative Analysis of the Laws of Ontario and British Columbia 
Concerning the Right of Mental Health Patients to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment” (2013) 
46 UBC L Rev 2.
132. The Ontario Court of Appeal in its landmark decision in Fleming v Reid, supra note 4, put 
significant constraints on the province with respect to limiting prior expressed wishes of a 
competent individual regarding psychiatric treatment.
133. This in fact happened in PS with the appellant’s involuntary status allowed to lapse and the 
CCB thus losing jurisdiction over his detention. The appellant argued unsuccessfully that 
he would be recertified if he attempted to leave and thus that the Board should have taken 
jurisdiction. Because this is such a common practice, courts are sometimes willing to decide 
moot cases in this context. See e.g. McCorkell, supra note 7.
